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A Life to Value
 

                                                                                                                            

Jeannie Azzopardi

OMDE 625

Summer 2006

University of Maryland University College

 

 

            This paper exams the issue of emergency education for the refugees of the Sudan with an emphasis on the Darfur region. Education has been a low priority in the eyes of the Sudanese government for many decades. Educational efforts among the many non-governmental aid organizations have been sorely lacking. Yet, there is a consensus among agencies that the need for education is great; that education may be the only path to peace.

            This research asks where the benefits of distance education (rarely scrutinized) might best be utilized in a country – and its regions – that have been long adrift in strife and continuing atrocities. Where education has been, what circumstances are currently present, what future prospects may look like and where distance education and learning can best be employed will be discussed.

 

Background

 

Historical Conflict

            Sudan claimed independence from Britain in 1956. “However, the Arab-led Khartoum government reneged on promises to southerners to create a feral system, which led to a mutiny by southern army officers that launched 17 years of civil war (US State Dept, 2006),” creating millions of refugees that spilled into the surrounding countries of Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Congo.

 

Line of Demarcation 1       

US State Department Website: http://www.state.gov/cms_images/sudan,ap.jpg

 

 

            Unlike the stanch configuration of the United States Civil War, the Sudanese civil war was not “simply one of ‘North versus ‘South’ – but one of peripheral minorities against a central elite…” (Verny, p.4).  Marginalization continued and Northern Sudanese were the beneficiaries as the Arab community grew.

 

            The signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement (Wikipedia, 2006) in 1972 gave relative peace to the Southern Sudanese for the next decade. Civil war again took hold in the 1980’s when President Gaafar Nimeiry initiated Shari’a Law and contravened the Addis Ababa Agreement. As the 1990’s approached, a coup resulted in General Umar al-Bashir taking the governmental reins and “install[ing] the National Islamic Front “(US

State Dept, 2006). The chasm between the Arab faction and the ‘African’ faction continued to grow.

            Southern Sudan suffered greatly during the times of civil war; the economy, malnutrition, starvation, health care and education were all sacrificed to the war.

In response, a rebel force grew: The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, or SPLM/A. The Khartoum government, it was clear, supported the Islamic agenda and the Arab faction. The SPLM/A became the voice of the Southern Sudanese. Throughout the next two decades, as the international and African communities sought to assist Sudan toward peace, the Khartoum government began to quietly pursue a policy “of arming ‘Arab tribesmen and – later – actively disarming ‘non-Arab’ groups” (Verny, p.18).

            The Sudan’s history of slavery – Southern slaves sold to the north – has “had a profound impact on the nation’s psyche” contributing to “Sudan’s crisis of identity” (Verny, p.5). Much of this disparity comes from the Northern Sudanese whose lineage is of Arabian descent seeing themselves as superior to their ‘African’ cousins in the south and disassociating themselves from that heritage.

            Entering the new millennium, in the western Darfur regions where, for generations, the agricultural tribesmen and the Arab nomads had settled territorial disputes by the use of informal council, governmental militia (janjawid) effectively dispersed such councils, leaving an environment ripe for resentment. To exacerbate the situation, the condition of drought was then years old, forcing the Arab nomad to encroach into the farm lands for sustenance for livestock. Violence erupted and escalated quickly. Landholders were forcibly driven from their villages or killed by janjawid; women and girls raped; land taken and men slaughtered or forced into military duty, all under Khartoum endorsement.

Darfur Crisis:

Testimonies from Eastern Chad (Amnesty International)

Click Here

 

            Peace, slow in coming, did arrive to end the second civil war. “The effort was mediated by retired Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo…and in an extraordinary session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in Nairobi, Kenya” (Us State Dept, 2006) an agreement was reached by which wealth-sharing would take place and Southern Sudan would be self-directed. Included in the concessions was the agreement to cease hostilities in Darfur which, by this time, had drawn undeniable attention and was being considered a ‘war’. No one in the international community was willing however, to label the violence genocide…not yet. As Verney (n.d.) states, “The use of the term ‘genocide’ by some observers, including the US, was treated with extreme caution” (p.22). 

            After attempts at reconciling differences through political means without success, the feelings of marginalization grew among the Darfur tribesmen. Rebel forces organized and grew. The Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), formerly the Darfur Liberation front, and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) initiated attacks against the Khartoum government. The government response was immense and devastating. “The result over the next two to three years was the deaths of between 180,000 – 300,000, the external displacement of around 1.8 million people and the exodus to Chad of another 220,000 refugees” (Verner, p. 19).

            In early March of 2005 the names of several Sudanese government officials suspected of crimes against humanity were handed over to the “Hague-based International Criminal Court” for investigation based on a resolution from the U.N. Security Council. The next month, in direct defiance of “the U.N. Security Council resolution…” President Bashir stated, “‘I swear thrice in the name of Almighty Allah that I shall never hand any Sudanese national to a foreign court’” (Verney, p.22).

            The Sudanese government continues to impede African Union peace-keeping forces through sabotage of fuel supplies and creating one barrier after another for assistance for the people of Darfur. The handling of humanitarian workers by the government has been contemptible. Verney (n.d.) points to “militia attacks on aid convoys…so great that some agencies have been obliged to suspend operations – or to pull out altogether. There are UN no-go areas in Darfur, and the government can halt aid when it chooses” (p.27). For the refugees trying to find asylum further into Chad, their only aid comes from NGOs and UN agencies.

            The few refugees from Darfur that have followed the Southern Sudanese refugees into the Arab countries of Egypt, Lebanon and Syria have found surly and indifferent aid workers from the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). Egyptian riot police reportedly killed 20 people after a protest in Cairo by refugees unable to obtain assistance from the local office of UNHCR – some waiting two years or more. “The Egyptian government pointed out that it had tolerated the [protest] for three months and had acted at the request of the UNHCR” (Verney, p.25).

           

            In an address before the Committee on International Relations in the U.S. House of Representatives, Lloyd O. Pierson, Assistant Administrator for Africa commenting on the May 5, 2006 signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement acknowledged that “the resulting violence affect[ed] an estimated 3.8 million people, more than 2 million of whom have been driven from their homes.” Pierson was optimistic about the agreement: “This peace agreement has finally brought some hope to Darfur’s people by addressing their long-standing marginalization…”  This is despite his concession that the Janjawid has not ceased their violent tactics and threats to “humanitarian organizations [that are] increasingly targets of attacks on compounds and vehicles” (Pierson, 2006).

            There is no protection in the IDP camps. The Janjawid “…have terrorized the displaced people’s camps with impunity” while the government will not allow new IDPs to be registered, leaving them without supplies and sustenance” (Verney, p.20). Verney (n.d.) underscores the unstable conditions for the refugees as “…deliberate attacks, systematic sexual violence and the killing of IDPs in camps” as well as NGO workers and “personnel from the African Union peace-keeping mission.” (p.20). The IDPs then head for Chad, already an imperfect host country “…prone to drought and with poor infrastructure and limited presence of aid agencies” (Amnesty, §4.1.2).

            In the latter part of 2004, CHF (Community, Habitat and Finance) filed a report with USAID regarding the well-being of the IDP camps in Darfur. Zam Zam was one camp visited (the camp gets its name from the village it occupies). At that time the camp was estimated to have over 30,000 occupants. CHF surveyed a sample of the population of the Zam Zam Camp. 3,000 adults were asked a series of questions regarding life at the Zam Zam camp such as; how long they have been at the camp; how many farm animals they have and the problems they have with the animals and so forth. “The final question of the survey was open-ended. It was:

‘Aside from the questions we asked, what do you think is the greatest problem you face staying in the camp?’”(CHF, p.5).

Issue of Concern Freely Raised

# of families citing issue as the greatest problem*

% of 3,000 surveyed that raised the issue

Rape**

2148

72%

Uncertainty about the future

1217

41%

Road safety traveling to Al-Fasher

1132

38%

Clothing

986

33%

Lack of privacy

897

30%

Lack of proper education for children

812

27%

Lack of cash resources for special purchases

455

15%

Lack of WFP ration cards

218

7%

Internal camp violence

214

7%

From: The United States Agency for International Development (2004)

 

            It was clear that education was a priority. In Amnesty International USA’s (n.d.) report from Chad’s camp ‘Tina 2’ the refugees again raised concern for the children, “…most importantly the lack of education facilities…” despite the construction of “…a large hut that they had built for the schooling of their children.”  Curricula in Chad are quite different from that in Darfur - the local school systems will not accept the children and the refugees found “…local authorities reluctant to help…,” but the Darfur families “…all [nonetheless] stressed that they saw the provision of education for children and students as a priority” (§4.1.2).

 

Educational Background

Sudan’s independence brought a bequest of “colonial administration…and was biased in favor of the needs of the administration and a Western curriculum” (Wikipedia, 2006). The south had suffered such a lack of resources for schooling that, as far back as the 1930’s; the chore was left to missionaries. At the onset of the civil war, all missionaries were expelled, intensifying the poor educational situation. The Nimeiri government revamped the system focusing on elementary, vocational and technical schooling. For those who did not attend university, “little was done to prepare for technical work or skilled labor…” (Wikipedia, 2006).

“Of the more than 5,400 primary schools in 1980, less than 14% were located in southern Sudan,” and these were mostly destroyed at the onset of the second civil war. Teachers and students were among the refugees escaping the hostilities.

Technical schools, a high priority previously, had become grossly outnumbered by academic secondary schools. Training had suffered at the hands of inadequate curricula, among other things, and graduates came away with an education better suited in urban rather than in agricultural areas. Academic training was seen in a more prestigious light than that of agricultural occupations – especially by the Arab population (Wikipedia, 2006).

The Omdurman Ahlia University, outside the capital of Khartoum, is “nongovernmental, job-oriented, and self-supporting” and became very successful and prominent, but again catered to academics (Wikipedia, 2006).

            The reformation of education by General Bashir in the 1990’s brought Muslim curriculum to the educational table replacing English with Arab as the primary language of instruction. Teaching from the Q’uran and the books of the hadith were to be compulsory.

            University admission requires membership in the “Popular Defence Forces, a paramilitary body allied to the National Islamic Front” (Wikipedia, 2006). Those academics that oppose this rule are discharged.

 

Education, Refugees, IDPs and the Current State of Things

            Repatriation to the south for the refugees of the civil war has been in progress for a few short years. As Tim Brown reports in the Forced Migration Review (2005), the schools have been decimated with “[f]ewer than 200 of the 1,600 schools…” still standing. After decades of living in camps with structure and assistance from NGO’s, many “refugees have received a better education than those left behind.” Much of this may be attributed to the fact that many teachers enjoyed incentives and competitive salaries paid for by non-governmental organizations while teachers at home, what few there were, were rarely paid at all (Sommers, 2005).

Gender-based Violence:

 

“Gender-based violence (GBV) is a term describing any harm perpetrated against a person that results from unequal power relationships determined by social roles ascribed to males and females […] including rape, sexual coercion, and abduction… domestic violence, early/forced marriage, lack of property rights, exclusion from education, and female genital mutilation (FGM).”

Ward, 2005

 

            According to the Parliamentary Assembly of Europe (2004), “The situation of refugees and IDPs is an abnormal and temporary state…” that is dependent upon a decision of repatriation, assimilation into a host country or relocation to a third country. Until such time, “…educational provision must be made for each eventuality” Clean water, food, sanitation and housing are crucial for the survival of the refugee and IDP and, as The Parliamentary Assembly of Europe states, “For refugees and IDPs education is a basic essential” as well (Refugee, 2004).  Recommendation 1652, Education of refugees and internally displaced persons from the Parliamentary Assembly includes some of the following topics which will be discussed:

 

þ    “Education can be a tool for protection and for promoting tolerance, peace and conflict resolution…and for combating the use of refugees as political hostages. (Refugee, 2004)

 

       Female education is still an issue of large proportion. Brown reports that, “Ninety percent of women are estimated to be illiterate” (Brown, 2005). Even vocational training for girls is scare – or nil (Sommers, p.260) Girls, traditionally seen as a valuable commodity at home with “…responsibilities [that] include …planting, weeding, harvesting, and pounding grain, household construction and maintenance; tending to the animals; and taking care of the children, sick, disabled and elderly (USAID, 2003),” have been denied education…or simply not had the time to attend school.

       Female refugees and IDPs of Darfur are in fear of attack from Janjawid whenever they venture away from the negligible safety of their living quarters and this adds to the trepidation of attending school.

       It is understood that “[p]eace building in Southern Sudan requires a shift from authoritarianism and patriarchy toward…” more gender tolerant and contributory methods and “[s]chools are a critical site for this transformation” (Kirk, 2005).

       “The Gender Equity Support Programmes of the SoE/Sudan Basic Education Programme” is one of the humanitarian agencies that offer ‘comfort kits’ for school aged girls. Intended to “enable[e] girls to spend longer in the classroom and to no longer absent themselves during menstruation…[the kits]…include[e] sanitary pads, underwear and soap.”

       The school can be female friendly but ‘[m]ale teachers, despite becoming more aware of girls’ needs and perspectives, lack information and tools to transform their teaching practices accordingly” (Kirk, 2005).

       Poor management, lack of management or deplorable management are often cited factors in the inadequate educational services provided refugees and IDPs (USAID, 2003). The use of military in educational management positions with control over students, teachers, curriculum and the actual right to education of refugees is not only startling but horrifying. This level of authority has “…led to serious human rights offences...” and “...in terms of the rights of children, potentially and sometimes demonstrably, dangerous” (Sommers, p.260). As the Khartoum government has continued to harass and intimidate IDPs, their camps, teachers students and aid workers, “…efforts required to both educate and learn in an environment of harshness [are] striking…including…efforts to simultaneously resist central elements of a curriculum considered a cause of civil war while having to use it” (Sommers, 2005).

 

þ    Host countries must cooperate with aid organizations both on the local and governmental level. (Refugee, 2004)

 

       Obviously, this must pertain to not only the host government but the home government as well – for those internally displaced persons.  The government of Southern Sudan cannot support the return of the refugees and IDPs in many ways including educationally, for lack of resources which the northern Khartoum government has but will not put “…them at the disposal of the populations it has played a role in displacing.” It can be said that the central government, although having inclinations toward the return of the IDPs to Southern Sudan, “…have a vested interest in some remaining in the north because of cheap labor…and the foreign aid they attract” (Verney, 2005).

 

þ    …refugees and IDPs require specific psychological care…call[ing] for specially trained teachers and specific materials. (Refugee, 2004)

       As stated above, GBV is a critical issue for the female refugee and IDP. Not only does the female contend with the dangers outside the perimeter of the camp but danger within the camp is just as real. Specific training for teachers is essential. Techniques for assessment, recognition, reporting and response of gender-based violence can be an important component of “[t]eacher training and student workshops…” (Kirk, 2005)

       Psychological training for humanitarian workers and teachers cannot be overlooked nor undervalued. Rape is a common occurrence, sexual exploitation and abuse; the abduction and abandonment of children; the tradition of female genital mutilation (FGM) and the constant threat of any of these incidents is reason enough to tutor those with personal contact with refugees (Unicef, 2005).

       As time goes on, the fallout from emotional and psychological trauma, if left unchecked, will certainly affect learning. Sensitivity training that addresses the special needs of victims of abuse as well as the atrocities of war will be essential.

 

þ     “…take account of education already acquired by refugees and IDPs…” (Refugee, 2004)

       “Kalma is the largest IDP camp in Darfur…, between 150,000 and 160,000 people,” and home to many families with adolescents. The primary focus of emergency education aid is toward younger children. As a consequence, many of the older children have fallen to “petty crime and commercial sex work.” Teachers among the IDPs began holding “some informal classes” but the students were unable to afford the cost. (IRIN, 2006)

       Some of the older children had “proposed to support the community by rebuilding houses destroyed during the rainy season…” but the funds were not available for supplies. Nor were there funds for “…catch-up classes, accelerated learning and basic literacy programmes for young adults” (IRIN, 2006).

 

þ    “…train teachers for the specific education of refugees and IDPs…” (Refugee, 2004)

       A continuing problem is teachers with little “professional training” or having ‘completed only about four years of primary education” ((Brown, 2005).

       The training of female teachers lags sorely behind in southern Sudan and there are “…even fewer women in education management roles.” Special attention to the needs of female teacher training should be acknowledged; not in ways that demean, rather in ways that allow sharing of respect and consideration. (Kirk, 2005)

       Attraction and retention of women into the teaching force has been extremely difficult. Teachers are not often paid. As Sommers (2005) points out in Islands of education, “This is a controversial issue,” but one that is certainly unavoidable. If non-governmental agencies are taking the role of what rightfully should be the role “…government education ministries should properly assume…,” then how can a community be held to the “…’ownership of [its] schools”? Many teachers receive training through NGOs only to move on to paying positions elsewhere (p. 258).

       Many teachers not recruited, forced or abducted into the military “…have had inferior qualifications, low morale and poor motivation…” In his research of “…more than a decade...,” Sommers (2005) argues vehemently that, “A central finding of this research is that not paying teachers has a direct and negative impact on educational quality” (p. 259).

 

þ    A “…sustained commitment…‘soft sector’ needs are too often ignored.

þ    The need to “…enter into partnership agreements with the European Union, UNHCR, Unicef and the World Health Organization to tackle the problem of refugees and IDPs…” (Refugee, 2004)

 

       The inconsistencies in humanitarian aid; the ‘sustained commitment’; repeated efforts; and the dismissive handling of refugees by non-governmental organizations are obviously iniquitous – yet, it is an extremely complicated issue. As Sommers (2005) states, “Indeed, the case of southern Sudan reveals the magnitude of the international humanitarian regime’s inability to adequately address fundamental needs in times of war” (p. 253). Of course, the Khartoum has not helped matters with restrictions and bullying. Access to many areas is difficult there is “…instability, poor infrastructure [and] disastrous humanitarian

situations…[n]onetheless, despite all of these …reasons, the will to address the right of Southern Sudan children and youth to education [has] remained inconsistent and, on the whole, conspicuously inadequate” (p. 253).

       Donor resolve and what has been committed shows “…an alarming lack of connection…and sufficient support for education in times of war.” Persistence of conflict and an undermining of assistance for refugees and IDPs can only be the negative sum of agencies neglecting educational needs, and, as Sommers (2005) points out, “[e]xamples of unfortunate donor actions and inactions…have been voluminous” (p. 257).

       Although not in every agency – or in every instance,  the lack of coordination between governments, organizations and within organizations seems unruly and is disconcerting. Verney (n.d.) underscores this,

“The international community and …NGOs have sometimes let enthusiasm about the prospects for peace blind them to factors that could derail the process. Their own weaknesses include a lack of coordination and too little involvement of …local NGOs, whose capacity they should be strengthening” (p. 27).

       It is a shameful waste of resources in cases where one hand does not know what the other is doing as Sommers (2005) reports, “The U.S. government case involving the State Department and USAID, where both agencies began developing teacher training capacities for Southern Sudan without knowledge of the other’s activities.” This example, UNHCR in Cairo and other agencies failings stand as “…glaring weaknesses…” in the coordination of international humanitarian aid (p.258).

       For educational, peace-keeping, conflict resolution and domestic violence issues, “[t]he intelligent support of the international community will be vital” (Verney, p. 27).

A note -

        In researching this paper, the author found mention of distance education strategies for Sudan in only two sources, both were USAID –

       The June, 2003 United States Agency for International Development Interim Strategic Plan for Sudan, makes reference to distance education as part of their “Strategic Objective 6. Increased Equitable Access to Quality Education,” in this way:

       “…delivery of distance education programming to adults and out-of-school youth in cattle camps and fishing camps,” but does not elaborate on methods of delivery (p. 22).

       In discussion of “Low-cost appropriate technologies to support non-formal education programs…,” the Plan suggests: “Teacher training for non-formal education; develop and utilize appropriate instructional technologies, such as radio education; [and] create distance education materials…” (p. 25). The Plan does not specify what ‘distance education materials’ would be. Of the few more mentions of distance education in the Plan, there is no detail of what these materials or methods might be.

       The USAID (2003) Mission Budget Data Sheet for Sudan Education listed under: “Non-formal education….non-formal education and distance learning for out-of school youth and adult learners… [a]pproximately 250 women will be promoted into teacher training programs through this course” (p.1). In the 2006 USAID Operational Plan, there was no mention of any of these programs.

 

The Implications for Distance Education:

Conclusions:

       It is clear that the infrastructure and instability of Southern Sudan and Darfur will not support higher forms of distance education. Some areas of Darfur cannot support educational efforts of any type – not even emergency educational aid. The primary educational needs of the Sudan can be prioritized and given consideration in the realm of distance education in a way that would best serve the refugees and IDPs currently in camps and those repatriating.

      

Recommendations are:

teacher training

 

  • Training teachers cannot be of benefit if they cannot be paid. Scholarship programs for training are common – especially for women. The schooling should be free of charge and the scholarship better spent as ‘incentive’ money for those teachers willing to commit to a three year teaching contract in areas most in need.

 

  • Distance training programs for teachers can be provided through radio, audio/ video tapes, printed materials and (where available) online courses. Many women’s centers are being created in Southern Sudan through the efforts of international NGOs - even some small women’s ‘centers’ are being developed in IDP camps (like the one pictured below in Kalma).  These would be ideal locations for distance education materials to be of use…and for teaching ‘incentives’ to be utilized.

 

  • University Studies: In and out of the Sudan – distance education courses specific to refugee studies/developing countries studies that bring awareness to the problems faced by the people of Darfur, the Sudan and other countries. Creation of a network of such universities and coursework.

 

Female Education

 

  • Distance education for teachers of both genders: Audio/video tapes, printed material and (where available) radio or online courses that cover the needs of female students – menstruation, patriarchal and domestic violence issues.
  • Vocational Training: Audio/Video tapes, printed material and (where available) radio or online courses that teach out-of-school female youth and adults employable skills.
  • Literacy: Audio/Video, printed material and (where available) radio or online courses that teach reading and writing skills to females. This activity would be another excellent pursuit for the women’s center venue where the women could have each other’s support and motivation.

Cooperation of Agencies

 

The United Nations:

A clearinghouse for training programs for teachers, directors, managers and others involved in setting up refugee camps and educational programs. Most NGOs create reports that are directly or indirectly delivered to the UN. Two of the largest and most prolific aid agencies dealing with refugees and IDPs are UNESCO and UNHCR – both directly linked to the United Nations.

  • A database listing specific activities of agencies, specific materials for educational purposes – including an electronic library of distance education materials (audio/video tapes, printed materials, etc) for basic tutor/teacher training, general training for sanitation, health, camp management, family planning, etc. and specialized training in psychological needs (trauma care and sensitivity training) for agency workers and local government and local NGO workers.

 

Specialized training

Police training: Audio/video tapes, printed and (where available) radio or online distance educational materials addressing sexual abuse issues including GBV, domestic violence, assessment and intervention. Networking web training between collaborative agencies.

Medical: Audio/video tapes, printed and (where available) radio or online courses in forensic nursing techniques - assessment of GBV, rape, domestic violence and treatment of victims. Mobile treatment facilities could both benefit from distance learning videos in this area.

Legal: Audio/video tapes, print and (where available) radio or online courses: “On-going [and law school] training for the judiciary and for lawyers on women’s rights and GBV” (Ward, 2005).

Health Issues: Audio/video tapes, printed and (where available) radio or online courses for secondary schools, health professional and other professionals having close contact with high-risk persons (social workers, correctional officers, police officers, etc.) for HIV/AIDS awareness.

 

 

            Some recommendations listed would be difficult to achieve given the cooperation required. Others, like forensic nursing techniques, literacy programs, and sensitivity training would be easily obtainable with minimal funding and an altruistic spirit.

            Perhaps the Sudan will find peace soon – certainly appropriate and timely education can help that process.

“Shifting from reliance to self-reliance – and, indeed toward independence cannot easily be accomplished if the dependant population is profoundly undereducated.”

Marc Sommers

 

 

 

 

 


References

 

Amnesty International: Working to protect human rights worldwide. (June, 2006). Darfur

            crisis: Testimonies from eastern Chad. Retrieved June 30, 2006 from

            http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR200072006?open&of=ENG-SDN

Amnesty International USA. (n.d.) Women’s human rights.  Sudan. Darfur: “Too many

people killed for no reason.” Retrieved June 2, 2006 from http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/document.do?id=4C799666405CAA2080256E2300688912Women's Human Rights

Brown, Tim. (2005). Education crisis in south Sudan [Electronic version]. Forced

Migration Review, 24, 57.

CHF: Community, Habitat and Finance International. (2005). Success story from Sudan:

Miriam’s story. Retrieved August 9, 2006 from http://www.chfinternational

.org/content/general/detail/1362

IRIN News.Org. (7 Monday, 2006) United Nations Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs. Sudan: Darfur youth idle, neglected. Retrieved 7 Monday, 2006 from http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48562

&SelectRegion=East_Africa&SelectCountry=SUDAN

Kirk, Jackie. (2005). Gender, education and peace in southern Sudan [Electronic version].

Forced Migration Review, 24, 55-56.

Pierson, Lloyd O. (2005). Prospects for Peace in Darfur. Proceedings of the Committee of

            International Relations: United States House of Representatives. May 18, 2005.

            Retrieved June 15, 2006 from http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations

            /109/pie051806.pdf

Sommers. Marc. (2005). Islands of education: Schooling, civil war and the Southern

Sudanese (1983-2004). Delacroix, Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning - UNESCO. 

The Refugee Law Reader. (2 March, 2004). Hungarian Helsinki Committee. Education of

refugees and internally displaced persons. Recommendation #1652 of the Parliamentary Assembly of Europe: Committee on Culture, Science and Education. Retrieved July 2, 2006 from http://www.refugeelawreader.org/index.d2?target=getpdf&id=685

United Nations Economic and Social Council. (8 August, 2005). Summary of midterm

reviews and major evacuations of country programmes: Middle East and North African region. United Nation’s Children Fund (UNICEF Publication No.0545496).

United States State Department (January, 2006). Bureau of African Affairs. Background

            note: Sudan. Retrieved July 3, 2006 from

            http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm

United States Agency for International Development. (2003). USAID Data sheet: Sudan

            education, strategic objective budget.  Retrieved August 2, 2006 from

            http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/afr/pdf/650-006.pdf

Verny, Peter. (n.d.) FMO Country Guide: Sudan. Forced Migration Online: A world of

            information on human displacement. Retrieved July 4, 2006 from

            http://www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo040/fmo040.pdf.

Ward, Jeanne. (2005, March). Report of a preliminary assessment of gender-based

violence in Rumbek, Aweils (East and West), and Rashad County, Nuba

Mountains. “Because now men are really sitting on our heads and pressing us down…” Washington D.C: The United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Retrieved May 31, 2006 from http://www.womenwarpeace.org/sudan/docs/usaidgbv.doc

Wikipedia: The free encyclopedia. (June, 2005) Education in Sudan. Retrieved June 30,

            2006 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Sudan

United States Agency for International Development. (2003). Interim strategic plan for

            Sudan, 2004-2006. Retrieved July 3, 2006 from

            http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sudan/sudan_isp.pdf

 

 

 

 

 





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